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The Supreme Court is currently considering in King v. Burwell 
whether residents of all States can receive premium tax credits under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 The Plaintiffs-
Petitioners brought this litigation as a challenge to the validity of a 
Treasury Department rule allowing all ACA health insurance Exchanges 
or marketplaces, including federally facilitated Exchanges (FFEs), to 
support and grant the credits.2 They invite the Court to focus solely on 
four words in two subsections of Section 36B of the Internal Revenue 
Code3 that they interpret as limiting tax credits to individuals who can 
use a State-operated Exchange to enroll in qualified health plans. If the 
Court follows existing precedent, however, it will look at the text of the 
statute as a whole, rather than at this single clause in isolation.4 If it does, 
                                                                                                             
 *  Timothy Stoltzfus Jost is the Robert L.Willett Family Professor of Law at 
Washington and Lee University. James Engstrand is a lawyer practicing in Oklahoma 
City. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
2 Exchanges are often referred to as “marketplaces.” This article will use the statutory 
term, “Exchange.” The term “Exchange” is capitalized throughout this article as it is 
throughout the ACA. The capitalization is a reminder that the term is a defined term (see 
infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text), and includes FFEs as well as state-operated 
Exchanges. 
3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 
124 Stat. 213 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012)). 
4 See Brief of William Eskridge, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 6-12, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114) [hereinafter Amicus Brief 
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the Court will see that reading “established by the State” as the limitation 
that Petitioners urge upon it makes it necessary for the Court to engage in 
endless rationalizations, evasions, and circumventions in reading the rest 
of the statute. Indeed, if the Court accepts their reading, at least fifty 
provisions of the ACA would be made anomalous, if not absurd. 
The “Exchange established by the State,” language came out of the 
Senate Finance bill, S. 1796, which became a basis for the ACA in 
2009.5 The Finance bill provided for state-operated Exchanges and 
federal fallback Exchanges, as does the final ACA, but considered all 
Exchanges, state-operated or federally facilitated, to be State 
Exchanges.6 According to the Finance bill—and the final ACA—all 
Exchanges are effectively “established by the State,” that is, they are 
exchanges that the State either elected to operate on its own or elected to 
permit the federal government to operate for it. 
Interpreting the “Exchange established by the State” language of 
Section 36B to permit only Exchanges operated by states to issue 
premium tax credits creates four types of anomalies with respect to other 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act. First, it conflicts with the 
definitional sections of Title I, which define FFEs as Exchanges, 
possessing all the powers of state-operated Exchanges.7 Second, it 
renders a number of the provisions dealing with the functions and 
responsibilities of Exchanges nonsensical as applied to FFEs.8 Third, 
other instances where the ACA uses the phrase “Exchange established by 
the State” or “Exchange established under section 1311” cause 
difficulties if these phrases are interpreted as applying only to state-
operated Exchanges.9 Finally, there are yet other sections of the ACA 
that would not operate as they were obviously intended if the 
“established by the State” language is read to exclude FFEs.10 
                                                                                                             
of William Eskridge, Jr. et al. in Support of Respondents] (explaining why the Court 
must if it is to follow its own precedents consider the meaning of an entire statute and not 
focus on just a single phrase snipped out of context). 
5 S. 1796, 111th Cong., § 1205 (2009) (proposing to add § 36B(b)(2)(A)(i) to the 
Internal Revenue Code); see Brief of Health Care Policy History Scholars in Support of 
Respondents at 6-12, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114) (tracing the 
legislative history of the phrase “State exchanges” or “Exchanges established by the 
State”). 
6 In the Finance Committee’s report filed simultaneously with S. 1796 on October 19, 
2009, the term “state exchange” refers both to exchanges that result from exercise of the 
federal fallback power and to exchanges that support individuals’ right to the premium 
credits. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 19, 37 (2009). 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
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Some of these anomalies are arguably minor if considered singly. 
Others, however, are quite difficult to explain away. Indeed, some are 
more properly characterized as “absurdities.” D.C. District Circuit Judge 
Thomas B. Griffith, for example, in his majority panel decision in Halbig 
v. Burwell (since vacated), was forced by his grim determination to find 
that only state-operated exchanges could grant premium tax credits, to 
conclude that FFEs could enroll individuals who were not “qualified,” 
leaving the term “qualified individuals” meaningless.11 Petitioners also 
make this argument in their brief to the Supreme Court,12 although they 
concede that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
pursuant to its “broad power [under 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)] to ‘take such 
actions as are necessary to implement’ the ‘other requirements’” 
regarding the operation of Exchanges, could redefine “qualified 
individuals.”13 This, of course, begs the question of why HHS could not 
use the same “broad powers” to apply to FFEs the requirement that 
Exchanges make premium tax credits available.14 
In any event, cumulatively, the incongruities that Petitioners’ reading 
of 36B creates make it difficult to see how the Supreme Court could rule 
for Petitioners without ignoring the “fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” which the 
justices have repeatedly acknowledged in their decisions.15 
I. DEFINITIONS 
Section 36B(a) provides that tax credits are available to any 
“applicable taxpayer,” a term explicitly defined to mean a taxpayer 
whose household income is between 100 and 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level without any qualification as to through what sort of 
Exchange the credit was issued.16 A separate subsection of 36B that 
establishes the formula for calculating the premium assistance amount 
ties it to the lesser of the cost of the second-lowest cost silver plan 
                                                                                                             
11 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 404-405 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See infra text 
accompanying notes 50-59 (discussion of the “qualified individual” issue). 
12 Brief for Petitioners at 49-50, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114). 
13 Id. at 48 n.6. 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(2)(D) (2012) (describing provision of tax credits under 
section 36B as a requirement in all States). 
15 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting 
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)); see also Brief of 
William Eskridge, Jr. et al., supra note 4. 
16 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 
124 Stat. 215 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2012)). 
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available to the taxpayer or to the actual premium paid by the taxpayer 
for a plan in which the taxpayer was enrolled “through an Exchange 
established by the State under 1311.”17 The same formula (but adding 
“section” before 1311) is used to define the “coverage month” for which 
an applicable taxpayer is eligible for premium tax credits in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 36B(d)(2)(A)(i).18 
Both subsections reference section 1311.19 Section 1311 provides 
that “[e]ach state shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an 
American Health Benefit Exchange (referred to in this title as an 
‘Exchange’) for the state” that meets the requirements of section 1311.20 
Of course, Congress cannot literally order states to establish Exchanges, 
and thus section 1321 provides that if a state “elects” not to establish the 
“required” Exchange, the HHS “Secretary shall (directly or through 
                                                                                                             
17 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 
124 Stat. 213 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (2012)). 
18 Note that one of the two appearances of “enrolled in through an Exchange 
established by the State under [section] 1311” is redundant. Indeed it could be deleted 
from subsection (c)(2)(A)(i)—the “coverage month” definition—and subsection 
(b)(2)(A) would still do all the limiting work desired, whatever that may be, by testing 
the health plans one at a time. That subsection recognizes that members of a tax-filing 
unit might be enrolled in different plans. For any plan that does not meet all conditions, 
such as for not using an Exchange of any kind for enrollment, the premium paid for it 
does not count toward the sum. 
 In other words, Petitioners are incapable of producing a construction of section 36B, 
much less a construction of the whole ACA, that is free from redundancy, just as they 
claim respondents are incapable. In addition, as this article demonstrates repeatedly, the 
petitioners’ construction of section 36B would deprive many other sections of the ACA 
of meaning. But Petitioners’ case strictly depends on, among other things, rigid 
application of a no-surplusage principle. In sum, after various plain-meaning arguments 
are deployed against them, most notably the effect of the “Exchange” definition, 
discussed infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, and of Congress’s directive in 42 
U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) that an FFE is “such Exchange,” touching off a string of references 
and incorporations, and the anomalies set out in this article, Petitioners are left having to 
establish overriding force for their four words. Some form of no-surplusage principle, 
applied to the four words, is the only way they can do this. For example, in their brief to 
the Fourth Circuit, invocations of such a principle appear at 19 and 22. Brief for 
Petitioners at 19 and 22, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet the 
unavoidable redundancies in their own construction of section 36B make the principle 
unavailable to them. “[T]he canon against surplusage “assists only where a competing 
interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2248, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) cited 
at Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013). 
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1311, 124 
Stat. 173 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)). 
20 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) 
(2012)). 
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agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate such 
Exchange within the State.” 21 
“Exchange” is defined by the ACA in section 1563 to mean “an 
American Health Benefit Exchange established under section 1311.”22 
Because a section 1321 Exchange is an “Exchange” it is by definition a 
1311 state Exchange. Section 1311(b)(1) similarly tells the reader what 
“Exchange” means: the entity that a State is there described as 
establishing, which must conform to the requirements of section 1311.23 
Finally, section 1311(d)(1) provides, as one of those requirements via 
subsection (b)(1)(C) and so confirmed as definitional: “[a]n Exchange 
shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by 
a State.24 This defines any “Exchange” as “established by a State.” 
II. EXCHANGE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The actual determination of eligibility for advance premium tax 
credits is governed by ACA sections 1411 through 1413.25 These 
sections consistently refer to an “Exchange” without qualification. 42 
U.S.C. § 18081(a), for example, provides: 
The Secretary shall establish a program . . . for 
determining— 
(1) whether an individual who is to be covered in the 
individual market by a qualified health plan offered 
through an Exchange, or who is claiming a premium tax 
credit or reduced cost-sharing, meets the requirements of 
sections 18032(f)(3), 18071(e), and 18082(d) of this title 
                                                                                                             
21 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1311(c), 
124 Stat. 173 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2012)). 
22 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1563, 124 
Stat. 264 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (2012)); see 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1551, 124 Stat. 
258 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18111 (2012)) (“Unless specifically 
provided for otherwise, the definitions contained in section 300gg-91 of this title shall 
apply with respect to this title”). 
23 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) 
(2012)). 
24 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. 176 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1) 
(2012)). 
25 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, §§ 1411-
1413, 124 Stat. 224-235 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081–18083 
(2012)). 
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and section 36B(e) of title 26 that the individual be a 
citizen or national of the United States or an alien 
lawfully present in the United States; 
(2) in the case of an individual claiming a premium tax 
credit or reduced cost-sharing under section 36B of title 
26 or section 18071 of this title—(A) whether the 
individual meets the income and coverage requirements 
of such sections; and (B) the amount of the tax credit or 
reduced cost sharing; 
(3) whether an individual’s coverage under an employer-
sponsored health benefits plan is treated as unaffordable 
under sections 36B(c)(2)(C) and 5000A(e)(2) . . . .26 
42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(3) sets out the information that must be 
provided by an applicant who wishes to enroll in a qualified health plan 
through an Exchange for whom a premium tax credit or cost-sharing 
reduction payment is being claimed.27 42 U.S.C. § 18081(c)(1) requires 
Exchanges to submit information submitted to them to HHS for 
verification, including information regarding tax credit and cost-sharing 
reduction eligibility information, which must be verified by the IRS.28 42 
U.S.C. § 18081(c)(4)(B) gives HHS discretion in determining how 
Exchanges verify information in order to “reduce the administrative costs 
and burdens on the applicant.”29 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e) requires HHS to 
notify the Exchange of the results of the verification.30 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18081(e)(2)(A)(i) provides that, if the information provided by the 
applicant is verified, 
(i) the individual’s eligibility to enroll through the 
Exchange and to apply for premium tax credits and cost-
sharing reductions shall be satisfied; and 
                                                                                                             
26 42 U.S.C. § 18081(a) (2012). 
27 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1411(b)(3), 124 Stat. 225 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(3) 
(2012)). 
28 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1411(c)(1), 
124 Stat. 226 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18081(c)(1) (2012)). 
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1411(c)(4)(B), 124 Stat. 227 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18081(c)(4)(B) (2012)). 
30 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1411(e), 
124 Stat. 227 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e) (2012)). 
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(ii) the Secretary shall, if applicable, notify the Secretary 
of the Treasury under section 18082(c) of this title of the 
amount of any advance payment to be made.31 
42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(4)(A) provides the responsibilities of the 
Exchange to resolve certain inconsistencies in premium tax credit 
applications, while 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081(e)(4)(B)(i)–(ii) authorizes the 
Exchange to approve applications based on information provided by the 
applicant, or the Treasury Department, respectively, in certain 
circumstances.32 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(4)(C) requires Exchanges to 
notify applicants of appeal rights regarding premium tax credit 
applications, while 42 U.S.C. § 18081(f)(2)(A) requires Exchanges to 
review at the request of an employer a determination by the Exchange 
that an employer did not provide minimum essential coverage or 
affordable coverage to an employee, thus making that employee eligible 
for advance premium tax credits.33 
42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(1) requires HHS to establish a program under 
which: 
 
[U]pon request of an Exchange, advance determinations 
are made under section 18081 of this title with respect to 
the income eligibility of individuals enrolling in a 
qualified health plan in the individual market through the 
Exchange for the premium tax credit allowable under 
section 36B of title 26 and the cost-sharing reductions 
under section 18071 of this title.34 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c), HHS notifies Treasury and the 
Exchange of its determinations regarding premium tax credits and cost-
sharing reduction payments and Treasury makes payments of the 
premium tax credits and cost-sharing reduction payments directly to 
qualified health plan issuers.35 An issuer of a qualified health plan must 
                                                                                                             
31 42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(2)(A) (2012). 
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2012)). 
33 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1411(e)(4)(C), 124 Stat. 229 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18081(e)(4)(C) (2012)); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, tit. I, § 1411(f)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 229 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18081(f)(2)(A) (2012)). For either the tax penalty under subsection (a) or subsection (b) 
of I.R.C. § 4980H, an element is that some employee received a premium tax credit, thus 
an employer has an interest in this determination See I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a)(2) and 
(b)(1)(B). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(1) (2012). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c)(1)-(2)(A) (2012). 
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notify the Exchange that it has reduced premiums charged in the amount 
of the advance tax credit.36 
42 U.S.C. § 18083(a) provides, “[t]he Secretary shall establish a 
system meeting the requirements of this section under which residents of 
each State may apply for enrollment in, receive a determination of 
eligibility for participation in, and continue participation in, applicable 
State health subsidy programs.”37 The term “applicable State health 
subsidy programs” explicitly includes premium tax credits.38 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18083 also provides that “each state” shall be provided a single, 
streamlined application and that “each state” shall develop a secure 
electronic interface to handle premium tax credit applications.39 
It can be argued, of course, that these programs only determine 
eligibility based on section 36B, and that 36B only recognizes eligibility 
for individuals enrolled through a state-operated Exchange, but why 
would a FFE have to set up all these programs and make all these 
eligibility determinations only to tell individuals they are not eligible 
because no one in their state is eligible? And why would it be important 
to set up such a program in “each State,” no matter what kind of 
Exchange it had? 
IRC § 6103(l)(21)(B) authorizes the release of information needed to 
establish eligibility for tax credits or cost-sharing reduction payments to 
“an Exchange established under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.”40 This is the information that applicants are supposed to 
provide under 42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(3)(A) to an “Exchange” for their 
eligibility for premium tax credits to be determined.41 
Other required Exchange functions also make no sense if FFEs 
cannot grant premium tax credits. As noted earlier,42 section 1563 of the 
ACA and other provisions define all Exchanges, including FFEs, as 1311 
Exchanges, so federally-facilitates Exchanges must be able to carry out 
all 1311 (42 U.S.C. § 18031) Exchange functions. 
42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(5)(B) requires Exchanges to establish an 
internet portal to apply for premium tax credits and cost sharing 
reduction payments.43 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(G) requires Exchanges to 
                                                                                                             
36 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2012). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 18083(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 18083(e)(1) (2012). 
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 18083(b)(1)(A), (c)(1) (2012). 
40 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1414(a)(1), 
124 Stat. 236 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103(l)(21) (2012)). 
41 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1411(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. 225 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18081(b)(3)(A) (2012)). 
42 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(5)(B) (2012). 
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“establish and make available by electronic means a calculator to 
determine the actual cost of coverage after the application of any 
premium tax credit under section 36B of title 26 and any cost-sharing 
reduction under section 18071 of this title.”44 Exchanges must certify 
individuals for exemptions under the individual responsibility 
requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(H), some of which involve 
determinations of tax credit eligibility.45 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(I), Exchanges must notify the IRS of 
“the name and taxpayer identification number of each individual who 
was an employee of an employer but who was determined to be eligible 
for the premium tax credit under section 36B of title 26” because the 
employer failed to offer minimum essential coverage or because the 
employer failed to offer adequate and affordable coverage.46 Then, under 
42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(J), Exchanges must notify employers when 
individuals cease to be covered under a qualified health plan, which is 
relevant to employers because an employee’s enrollment in a plan, if 
joined with advance premium tax credits, may result in the employers’ 
I.R.C. § 4980H liability.47 Exchanges must establish navigator programs 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(4)(K) and 18031(i).48 One of the duties of a 
navigator is to “distribute fair and impartial information concerning . . .  
the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B of title 26 and 
cost-sharing reductions under section 18071 of this title.”49 Again, 
petitioners cannot explain why Congress would have hidden two phrases 
in the formula for calculating tax credits that would have required an 
FFE to perform all of these functions for no purpose. 
A basic function of an Exchange is to “make available qualified 
health plans to qualified individuals and qualified employers.”50 42 
U.S.C. § 18032(a)(1) provides “[a] qualified individual may enroll in any 
qualified health plan available to such individual and for which such 
individual is eligible.”51 The term “qualified individual” is used 
                                                                                                             
44 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(G) (2012). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(H) (2012). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(I) (2012). 
47 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(d)(4)(J), 124 Stat. 177 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(J) 
(2012)). 
48 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(d)(4)(K), 124 Stat. 177 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031(d)(4)(K) (2012)); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, tit. I, § 1311(i)(1), 124 Stat. 180 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031(i) (2012)). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i)(3)(B) (2012). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 18032(a)(1) (2012). 
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repeatedly in the ACA to refer to individuals served by an Exchange, or 
to distinguish “qualified individuals” from individuals not qualified to 
enroll in coverage through an Exchange.52 Only “qualified individuals” 
may enroll in catastrophic health plans, thus catastrophic plans would not 
be available in FFE states.53 States without “qualified individuals” will 
also be barred from the basic health plan provision of the statute.54 
A qualified individual is defined by the ACA, with respect to an 
Exchange (the term is used elsewhere in the statute for other purposes), 
as “an individual who—(i) is seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan 
in the individual market offered through the Exchange; and (ii) resides in 
the State that established the Exchange.”55 Obviously, if only state-
operated Exchanges can be considered to be State-established 
Exchanges, then FFEs cannot enroll qualified individuals in qualified 
health plans, leaving open the question of why FFEs exist at all. 
Conversely, if there are no “qualified individuals” who can enroll in 
FFEs, there is no need for the language in 36B restricting premium tax 
credits to state-established Exchanges.56 Petitioners, in attempting to deal 
with the “qualified individual” issue, basically argue that individuals who 
are not “qualified individuals” can enroll through the federal 
Exchanges,57 a silly argument given how the term is used in the ACA.58 
                                                                                                             
52 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(b)(2), (c)(1)(F), (c)(5)(B), (e)(1)(B), and (i)(4)(A)(ii) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18032(d)(3)(A) and (d)(3)(C) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18032(f)(1)(B) (excluding incarcerated individuals from definition of “qualified 
individuals”) and (f)(3) (2012) (limiting “qualified individuals” to those who are “lawful 
residents” of the United States). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(C) (2012). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e)(1) (2012). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
56 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (2012) (“The premium assistance amount determined under 
this subsection with respect to any coverage month is the amount equal to the lesser of—
(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in 
the individual market within a State which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or 
any dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer and which were enrolled in 
through an Exchange established by the State under 1311 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, or (B) the excess (if any) of—(i) the adjusted monthly premium for 
such month for the applicable second lowest cost silver plan with respect to the taxpayer, 
over (ii) an amount equal to 1/12 of the product of the applicable percentage and the 
taxpayer’s household income for the taxable year.”). 
57 Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 12, at 48. 
58 See supra note 52. Also, there would be no residency requirement at all, for use of 
the Exchange. Even foreign residents could use any FFE, so far as Federal law would be 
concerned. Once this attempt to escape the anomaly with non-qualified-individuals is 
rejected, it would also follow, from the text of the ACA if taken with a hyper-literalism 
comparable to the Petitioners’, that their merits position defeats their own standing. Since 
no plan could be bought on an FFE consistently with the ACA, it reasonably follows that 
there would be no “plan available” on any FFE. But, per the text of I.R.C. 
§ 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii), the amount of the premium for the lowest cost bronze “plan 
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They also argue that HHS can use its authority to make rules under 42 
U.S.C. § 18041 to get around this problem,59 but, as noted earlier, why 
could not HHS under the same authority work around the 36B 
“established by the State” language? 
Finally, there are the reporting requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f).60 
Section 36B(f) is a subsection of the same section that contains the 
“established by the State” language on which these cases are based. 
Section 36B(f) is entitled “Reconciliation of credit and advance credit” 
and requires the reconciliation of advance premium tax credits provided 
to enrollees with the actual credits they are due at the end of the tax 
year.61 Section 36B(f) provides that: 
Each Exchange (or any person carrying out 1 or more 
responsibilities of an Exchange under section 1311(f)(3) 
or 1321(c) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act) shall provide the following information to the 
Secretary and to the taxpayer with respect to any health 
plan provided through the Exchange: 
(A) The level of coverage described in section 1302(d) 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and 
the period such coverage was in effect. 
(B) The total premium for the coverage without regard to 
the credit under this section or cost-sharing reductions 
under section 1402 of such Act. 
(C) The aggregate amount of any advance payment of 
such credit or reductions under section 1412 of such Act. 
(D) The name, address, and TIN of the primary insured 
and the name and TIN of each other individual obtaining 
coverage under the policy. 
                                                                                                             
available” is a critical factor for attaining the affordability exemption of subsection (e)(1). 
With no such plan extant, that premium amount is either non-existent or zero. Either way 
it cannot “exceed[]” any number, which is the condition of the exemption and which 
Petitioners and all residents of FFE States could not satisfy. Petitioners rely on this 
affordability exemption to claim standing in this action. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 12, 
at 8-9. 
59 Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 12, at 48. 
60 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) (2012). 
61 Id. 
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(E) Any information provided to the Exchange, 
including any change of circumstances, necessary to 
determine eligibility for, and the amount of, such credit. 
(F) Information necessary to determine whether a 
taxpayer has received excess advance payments.62 
This provision explicitly applies to persons carrying out the 
responsibilities of FFEs (1321 Exchanges), and thus to States with FFEs, 
and requires them to report information to the IRS and to taxpayers 
regarding receipt of premium tax credits. This information may be of use 
to the IRS for determining compliance with the individual mandate, but 
its primary purpose, as noted in its title, is for reconciliation of advance 
premium tax credits with actual tax credits due. This provision was 
added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act,63 which was 
adopted subsequent to the amended ACA, and thus under the canons of 
statutory construction its language should prevail over contrary language, 
if any, found in the earlier adopted ACA.64 
III. OTHER “ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE” PROVISIONS 
The term “established by the State” appears in several other places in 
the ACA. One of these uses is arguably compatible with limiting the 
phrase to state-operated Exchanges.65 In each of the other places at which 
the phrase appears, however, it does not make sense to read the term 
“Exchanges” as applying exclusively to state-operated Exchanges. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3 requires states, as a condition of receiving any 
federal financial assistance after January 1, 2014, to enroll individuals 
identified by an “Exchange established by the State” in their Medicaid 
                                                                                                             
62 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3) (2012). 
63 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010). 
64 The later-adopted language should prevail under the principle of “leges posteriores 
priores contrarias abrogant—the rule that the more recent of two conflicting statutes shall 
prevail.” See United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, n.2 (4th Cir 2013). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3)(A) (2012) permits a State to authorize an “Exchange 
established by the State” to contract out responsibilities to an “eligible entity,” 
incorporated under the law of one or more States. Note that this is the one place in the 
portion of the ACA that created freestanding sections, codified in 42 U.S.C. chapter 157, 
where the “established by the State” phrase is used to describe an Exchange. Other places 
where this phrase is used are in amendments to pre-existing statutes such as the Internal 
Revenue Code, thus codified well away from those freestanding sections. In these 
locations, the phrase serves a descriptive purpose, pointing the reader back to the core 
ACA sections that describe Exchanges. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i) 
(2012). 
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and CHIP programs and to ensure that individuals who are ineligible for 
Medicaid and CHIP are enrolled through “such an Exchange” in a 
qualified health plan with premium tax credits.66 A state without an 
“Exchange established by the State” could not, therefore, have an 
approved Medicaid program after January 1, 2014. Exchanges 
“established by the State” can also under this section enter into 
agreements for the State Medicaid agency to determine eligibility for 
premium tax credits and must link the Exchange “established by the 
State” website to the state’s CHIP website.67 Again, why would FFEs not 
be permitted to coordinate with Medicaid and CHIP programs? 
Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(D) requires a secure 
electronic interface between the state Medicaid program and the 
“Exchange established by the State.”68 Assuming a state could have a 
Medicaid program in a FFE state, is security not an equal concern? It 
also makes no sense that a Medicaid program would need to coordinate 
with respect to enrollees enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP and a qualified 
health plan for state-operated Exchanges but not the FFE.69 Finally, it is, 
at least, arguable that all Exchanges, and not just state-established 
Exchanges, should have to coordinate their websites with Medicaid and 
CHIP program websites in the state in which the Exchange is located. 
42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(d)(3)(B) requires states that exceed their CHIP 
funding allotment to enroll children not eligible for Medicaid in a 
qualified health plan through an “Exchange established by the State.”70 
42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(3)(C) provides that, “[w]ith respect to each State,” 
HHS shall review the benefits and cost-sharing available through 
qualified health plans offered through “an Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311” to determine their equivalence to CHIP 
plans.71 Again, it makes no sense that states in FFE states would not be 
able to do the same. The text of the statute says that these are conditions 
that must be met for a state to have an approved CHIP program,72 and 
thus a state with an FFE could not have an approved CHIP program. 
                                                                                                             
66 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. II, § 2201, 124 
Stat. 289 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2012)). 
67 Id. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b)(1)(E) (2012). 
70 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. II, 
§ 2101(b)(1), 124 Stat. 286 and tit. X, § 10203(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 928 (2010) amended 
Section 2105(d) of the Social Security Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1397ee(d)(3)(B) (2012)). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(d)(3)(C) (2012). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(A) (2012) (“In addition to the payments made under 
paragraph (1), for each fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 2009 and ending with fiscal 
year 2013), the Secretary shall pay from amounts made available under subparagraph (E), 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg) requires that, subject to certain exceptions, 
states must maintain their Medicaid eligibility standards that were in 
effect on the date of enactment of the ACA until HHS determines that an 
“Exchange established by the State under section 1311” is fully 
operational.73 The maintenance of effort provision was obviously put in 
place to keep states from reducing Medicaid coverage until the ACA 
Medicaid expansions and premium tax credit programs were in place, but 
there is no reason this requirement should be limited to states with state 
Exchanges. Petitioners argue that the maintenance of effort provision 
remains in place in states with FFEs.74 But this is inconsistent with the 
exception for states with budget deficits in 1396a(bb)(3), which ends on 
December 31, 2013.75 It is also not the way that the states have 
understood the provision, including states that filed an amicus brief for 
Petitioners but have changed their Medicaid programs since 2013.76 
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-23(a)(2) requires pharmacy benefit 
managers to report certain pricing information to HHS if they manage 
pharmacy benefits for a qualified health plan offered “through an 
Exchange established by a State under section 1311.”77 Why limit this 
requirement to state-operated Exchanges? 
Several provisions of the ACA refer to “an Exchange established 
under 1311.” 26 U.S.C. § 6055, for example, requires entities that 
provide minimum essential coverage to report the coverage to the IRS 
and to covered taxpayers, and requires the return to specify whether the 
coverage was through a qualified health plan through an “Exchange 
established under section 1311.”78 26 U.S.C. § 125(f)(3) provides that 
the exclusion from an employee’s gross income of health benefits offered 
through a cafeteria plan does not apply to plans offered through an 
“Exchange established under section 1311.”79 Section 1331 of the ACA, 
                                                                                                             
to each State that meets the condition under paragraph (4) [Enrollment and retention 
provisions for children] for the fiscal year, an amount equal to the amount described in 
subparagraph (B) for the State and fiscal year.”). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)(1) (2012). A corresponding addition to the main list of State 
plan requirements, § 1396a(74), refers to subsection (gg). The two provisions were added 
by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. II, § 2001(b), 
124 Stat. 275 (2010)). 
74 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 12 at 50. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)(3) (2012). 
76 See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance at 35-36, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114). 
77 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VI, § 6005, 
124 Stat. 698 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-23(a)(2) (2012)). 
78 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1502(a), 
124 Stat. 250 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6055 (2012)). 
79 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1515(a), 
124 Stat. 258 (2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 125(f)(3)). 
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which establishes the basic health plan program, provides that an 
individual eligible for basic health plan coverage may not enroll in a 
qualified health plan through an “Exchange established under section 
1311.”80 Finally, the ACA amends 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C), section 
205(c)(2)(C) of the Social Security Act, to give an “Exchange 
established under section 1311” the ability to collect and use Social 
Security numbers.81 We can think of no reason why these provisions 
should apply to state-operated Exchanges but not FFEs. Judge Griffith at 
least conceded that FFEs were 1311 Exchanges, but that means all other 
1311 requirements apply to FFEs.82 
IV. OTHER ANOMALIES 
Obviously the biggest anomaly is that the three-legged stool on 
which the entire Title I is built collapses if the premium tax credit leg is 
removed. The premium tax credits are necessary, along with the 
individual mandate, to make the market reforms work. All three elements 
are necessary for the ACA to expand coverage as it was intended to do. 
Removing the premium tax credits would lead to a dramatic reduction in 
the number of Americans covered by health insurance, as recent studies 
by Rand and the Urban Institute demonstrate.83 
Judge Griffith explained this anomaly away in Halbig by arguing 
that the same situation exists with respect to the territories and the 
                                                                                                             
80 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 
§ 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. 176 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1) (2012)). 
81 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1414(a)(2), 
124 Stat. 237 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(first x) (2012)). 
82 See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 404 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 2014 WL 
4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). See supra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
83 See EVAN SALTZMAN AND CHRISTINA EIBNER, THE RAND CORPORATION, THE 
EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S TAX CREDITS IN FEDERALLY 
FACILITATED MARKETPLACES 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR980/RAND_RR
980.pdf (“Enrollment in the ACA-compliant individual market . . . would decline by 9.6 
million, or 70 percent, in federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) states”); LINDA J. 
BLUMBERG, ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE AFFECTED BY A 
SUPREME COURT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN KING V. BURWELL 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf417633 (“Of the 9.3 
million people estimated to lose tax credits under a finding for King, two-thirds would 
become uninsured”); LINDA J. BLUMBERG, ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF A SUPREME COURT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN KING V. BURWELL: 8.2 MILLION 
MORE UNINSURED AND 35% HIGHER PREMIUMS 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf417289 (“We 
estimate that a victory for the plaintiff would increase the number of uninsured in 34 
states by 8.2 million people”). 
264 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:249 
 
CLASS Act.84 In fact, however, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services had already changed its interpretation of the statute regarding 
the territories (and Judge Griffith’s clerk missed it) so that none of the 
three legs apply in the territories.85 And, Congress explicitly required 
HHS to determine whether an actuarially sound CLASS Act program 
could be created and repealed the Act when HHS determined that it was 
not possible. 
In another anomaly, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 creates a procedure through 
which states can, beginning in 2017, obtain waivers from HHS from 
certain requirements of the ACA, including the individual and employer 
mandates and the Exchange requirements, if they come up with a 
proposal that would afford coverage that was at least as comprehensive 
and affordable and cover at least a comparable number of residents as 
does the ACA.86 The amount of foregone tax credits would be given the 
state to administer its plan.87 If a state can nullify the employer mandate 
and the Exchange provisions of the ACA, and greatly weaken the 
individual mandate, by simply not operating a state Exchange, it would 
not have to wait until 2017, meet the requirements of the section, or get a 
waiver. The rigorous procedural and substantive requirements under this 
provision become meaningless. Moreover, how would HHS determine 
the amount of tax credits the state should get if it was getting none before 
2017 because it did not set up a state Exchange? 
Another option provided by the ACA is for states to establish Basic 
Health Program. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d)(3)(A)(i) provides that a state 
participating in the BHP is paid 95 percent of premium tax credits and 
cost-sharing reduction payments due its residents under 36B and 1402.88 
In an FFE states, this would be $0, so such a state could not have a BHP. 
Yet another option is for states to establish a demonstration project for 
wellness programs in the individual market.89 This provision imposes a 
                                                                                                             
84 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 2014 WL 4627181 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). In his decision, D.C. Circuit Judge Thomas B. Griffith 
discussed the lack of an individual mandate or premium subsidies in the Community 
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VIII, 
124 Stat. 828 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll–300ll-9), repealed by American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, tit. VI, § 642, 126 Stat. 2358 (2013). 
85 Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Comm’r 
Gregory R. Francis, Office of Lieutenant Governor (July 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/letter-to-Francis.pdf. 
86 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1332, 124 
Stat. 203 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012)). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(3) (2012). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d)(3)(A)(i) (2012). 
89 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1201(4), 
124 Stat. 154 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(l)(3)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
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requirement that the program “not increase the cost to the Federal 
Government in providing credits under section 36B of title 26” 90; this 
provision is meaningless if premium tax credits are not available in a 
state with an FFE. 
42 U.S.C. § 18031(f) provides for regional Exchanges.91 Regional 
Exchanges would not, however, under Petitioners’ blinkered definition, 
be “established by the State.”92 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93(c)(5) provides for 
consumer assistance programs for which all states or Exchanges can 
apply, which include among their duties assisting consumers in obtaining 
premium tax credits.93 29 U.S.C. §§ 218b(a)(1)–(2) require employers in 
all states to inform their employees of the availability of tax credits.94 
Moreover, pre-2010 Exchanges, recognized under 42 U.S.C § 18031(e), 
are not “established by the State under section 1311” and thus also could 
not grant premium tax credits.95 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1), multistate plans must be available in 
all states.96 Under 42 U.S.C. § 18054(c)(3)(A), “[a]n individual enrolled 
in a multi-State qualified health plan under this section shall be eligible 
for credits under section 36B of title 26 and cost sharing assistance under 
section 18071 of this title in the same manner as an individual who is 
enrolled in a qualified health plan.”97 
42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4) requires states to assume the cost of benefits 
that the state requires qualified health plans to cover, in addition to the 
cost of the essential health benefits required under the ACA.98 This 
makes sense if the premium tax credits and cost-sharing reduction 
payments assist in making the essential health benefits affordable. It 
makes little sense if the consumer must pay the full cost of the essential 
health benefits in FFE states, but the state must cover the cost of non-
essential benefits only. 
Finally, Section 1401(c) of the ACA requires the GAO to, not later 
than five years after enactment, conduct a study of the availability of 
                                                                                                             
90 Id. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f) (2012). 
92 Id. 
93 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1002, 124 
Stat. 138 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93(c)(5) (2012)). 
94 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1512, 124 
Stat. 252 (2010) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 218B(a)(1)–(2) (2012)). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e) (2012). 
96 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1334(a)(1), 
tit. X, § 10104(q), 124 Stat. 902 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1) 
(2012)). 
97 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. X, § 10104(q), 
124 Stat. 904 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(c)(3)(A) (2012)). 
98 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4) (2012). 
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affordable coverage, including the impact of the tax credits on 
affordability.99 Section 1313 requires a similar study of Exchange 
operations.100 If Congress only intended tax credits to be available 
through state-operated Exchanges, it seems like it would have directed a 
major focus on these studies to be on the difference in affordability in 
state-operated versus FFE states. Of course, this is not mentioned. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under well-established precedent, the Supreme Court must consider 
the entire text of the Affordable Care Act in determining whether the IRS 
rule permitting FFEs to grant premium tax credits is valid. If it finds for 
the rule’s validity, the Court must conclude, as have six of the nine lower 
court judges that have considered the issue, that the statute, as a whole, 
either conclusively requires that the FFEs grant tax credits, or, at least, 
that the IRS rule permitting them to do so is a permissible interpretation 
of the ACA. A conclusion to the contrary simply cannot be reconciled 
with numerous provisions of the statute. 
                                                                                                             
99 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(c), 
124 Stat. 220 (2010). 
100 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1313(b), 
tit. X, § 10104(k), 124 Stat. 184, 902 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18033(b) (2012)). 
